WE KEPT GOING UNTIL WE COULDN’T

Stuart Martin, the former CEO of Active Nation, spoke to WellNation to give an honest account of the leisure operator’s closure. He explains how energy costs and a lack of support saw the charity to “keep going until it simply couldn’t”

Active Nation, which managed sports and leisure facilities and services on behalf of local authorities in Southampton, Lincolnshire, Aldershot and Bristol, ceased trading in April this year. The charity was forced into liquidation due to a combination of energy costs increasing by up to 400 per cent and a failed bid to secure financial support from the Swimming Pool Support Fund. Stuart Martin, Active Nation’s CEO, says that the decision to cease trading was heart-breaking because it came at a time when participation numbers were increasing, sales were robust and retention of existing members was improving. The ending of long-standing energy contracts, however, simply left the organisation in an impossible situation. Gas and electricity prices had skyrocketed and any new agreement would’ve seen an “astronomical hike” in costs.

IN HIS OWN WORDS

We didn’t stop because we ran out of ideas or because people stopped coming. We didn’t stop because we lost belief in our mission.

We stopped because, despite our best efforts and strongest trading period in years, the cost of energy became completely unmanageable, and the support systems that should have helped us simply didn’t deliver when it really mattered.

We were doing the right things

Let’s be clear: participation was booming. Sales were strong. Retention was improving month on month. We’d built back from COVID faster than many in our sector, even exceeding pre-COVID participation levels within 18 months – well ahead of the national averages published through Moving Communities.

We introduced affordable subscription packages when people were struggling with the cost of living. We offered fl exibility, encouragement, and value - because we wanted people to keep moving, to stay connected, to feel good. And they did.

Operationally, we were winning. In normal trading conditions, we’d be running at a surplus. Our team was performing, our mission was being delivered, and we were rebuilding community trust. But we weren’t trading in normal conditions.

The energy crisis: a shock we couldn’t absorb When our long-standing energy contracts came to an end, we were faced with an impossible situation. The market had changed. Gas and electricity prices had sky-rocketed, and any new agreement meant astronomical costs. Some of our bills increased by over 400%. That’s not a typo - 400%.

For a charity operating swimming pools, large leisure centres, gyms and sports halls—these are huge, 7-day- a-week operations - this wasn’t a bump in the road. It was a wall. Our monthly energy costs were suddenly higher than some organisations’ entire annual budgets.

Our monthly energy costs were suddenly higher than some organisations’ entire annual budgets

We looked at every option. We took expert advice. We shopped the market. But no matter where we turned, the outcome was the same: energy costs had become a major liability, and we were the ones expected to carry it.

A sector left to fend for itself This is where it really started to hurt - not just financially, but emotionally too. Because we weren’t looking for handouts. We were looking for fair, timely support so we could keep serving communities.

We applied to the Swimming Pool Support Fund, a national pot designed to help exactly with this problem. But across five local authority partnerships, we weren’t awarded a single penny in the first phase. Not one site. The feedback from Sport England? Too much demand. Not enough to go around. Eventually, we were successful in two applications during the second phase. But those funds weren’t for now - they were for capital works to reduce energy use in the long term. That’s important, but when you’re haemorrhaging cash today, telling you savings will come in ten years’ time isn’t just unhelpful - it’s devastating.

We also turned to local authorities for emergency support. In some cases, they did offer help - but with terms that made it feel more like a trap than a lifeline: ● Funding was offered in small monthly amounts, impossible to plan against. ● Support came with major changes to contracts, often written to allow councils to walk away at any time. ● There was little or no acknowledgement of the pressures we were facing - or of the work we’d done to bring participation and community outcomes back post-COVID.

We needed partnership. What we got, in many cases, was bureaucracy and risk.

We didn’t run out of ideas. We ran out of runway.

Defending ourselves while the bills kept coming To make things worse, some councils questioned the decisions we made about our energy contracts - after we had signed them and after prices had already surged. They held back funds while they looked into our procurement processes, assuming we’d “chosen badly.”

This ignored the reality we were living in: there were no good deals. Everyone was facing the same sky-high prices. We were simply trying to keep the lights on – literally and figuratively.

While we were trying to explain our decisions, the bills didn’t pause. Cash reserves drained faster than we could replenish them. Every week spent waiting for a reimbursement put us deeper in the red.

A charity that refused to give up Through it all, we kept going. We didn’t panic. We didn’t stop serving. We didn’t compromise our purpose.

We adapted, we fought, and we held the line - because we believed in what we were doing, and because our supporters, staff and communities needed us.

The truth is, this wasn’t a failing charity. This was a charity caught in a perfect storm: ● Crushing energy costs with no relief ● Delayed or conditional funding from multiple directions ● A recovery system that looked good on paper but didn’t work in practice ● And a national picture where too many leisure providers were left to sink or swim alone.

The final reality

We didn’t run out of ideas. We ran out of runway. And that’s what led to the incredibly difficult decision to enter voluntary liquidation.

It’s heartbreaking, because it wasn’t the quality of our work, our people, or our vision that failed. It was the environment around us that made it impossible to continue - despite everything we got right.

We want this story told clearly, because it matters. Not just for the record, but for the future of our sector. Because unless something changes - unless the funding is fair, the support is fast, and the system is actually designed to help - this will happen again. And good organisations, doing great work, will be lost.

Active Nation

Timeline of events leading to voluntary liquidation

2019

Growth and excitement

We took on new clubs, ready to grow our impact and reach more communities. There was real momentum and optimism about what lay ahead.

2020

COVID hits

Just as the new clubs were due to launch, the pandemic struck. Lockdowns, tiered restrictions and repeated closures meant we couldn’t get going properly. Despite clubs being shut, the bills kept coming - leases, utilities, and other fixed costs continued to pile up. Trying to exit some of those leases was incredibly difficult, and our reserves started to wear thin.

2020-2021

Recovery Fund support (sort of)

We did get some help through the National Leisure Recovery Fund, but it only covered about half the charity. Many of our outdoor venues didn’t qualify. Accessing the funds wasn’t straightforward either - each local authority handled things differently, and payments were slow. In most cases, we had to pay reopening costs ourselves and wait to be reimbursed.

Most breaks on management fees came with the catch that they had to be repaid later. And we couldn’t easily adjust prices because of contract restrictions, even though costs were going up everywhere.

2021–2022

Bouncing back

In spite of it all, we saw a fantastic bounce back in participation, getting back to - and beyond - pre-COVID levels, ahead of national averages. We worked incredibly hard and adapted subscription offers to keep things affordable. We were finalists at the ukactive awards for the marketing initiative that achieved these results.

2022–2023

Energy costs go through the roof Just as we were getting back on our feet, the energy crisis hit. Our old contracts ended, and the new ones were astronomical - energy bills shot up by 400%. That alone was devastating.

Getting reimbursed through energy benchmarking took ages, and some councils challenged our energy deals instead of helping. We spent months trying to justify decisions we’d made in good faith - meanwhile, the bills didn’t stop.

2023–2024

Little support when it mattered most We applied for help through the Swimming Pool Support Fund but didn’t receive a penny in the first round across any of our local authority sites. Sport England said demand was too high. Two of our sites got support in round two, but it was only for future improvements- nothing to help with the crisis we were in right then.

We asked councils for support. A few offered some, but it often came with strings attached- monthly drip-fed payments, contracts that could be pulled at any time, or big changes that made the offers almost unworkable.

2024–2025

Fighting to keep going

We kept going because we believed in our mission. Sales were strong, people were coming through the doors, and we were doing everything we could to manage cash. Under normal circumstances, with energy prices at pre-crisis levels, we would’ve been running a surplus.

April 2025

No more runway

Despite all our efforts, we ran out of road. The energy bills were just too much. Support came too late, or not at all. We had to make the tough decision to enter voluntary liquidation.